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The Sky Is Not Falling: How the Anticlimactic
Application of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts to
Oklahoma’s Laboratory Report Procedures Allows Room
for Improvement
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts1 has swept the criminal justice system with
change. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia applied the principles of
Crawford v. Washington2 to find that a laboratory report constitutes a
testimonial statement requiring the protections of the Sixth Amendment’s right
to confrontation.3 Thus, laboratory reports can only be used if the analyst
testifies or is shown to be unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.4
While the dissent employed “sky-is-falling” rhetoric criticizing the practical
effects the majority’s holding will have on the criminal justice system, the
majority provided states with a roadmap for complying with the new rule.5
The Court approved the use of notice-and-demand statutes as an efficient
method for states to structure the introduction of laboratory reports at trial.6
Notice-and-demand statutes create procedural rules that “require the
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s
report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time
in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s
appearance live at trial.”7 These statutes enhance judicial efficiency by
requiring the analyst to testify at trial only when the defendant exercises his
right to confrontation.
The application of Melendez-Diaz to Oklahoma’s procedures will be far less
momentous than the dissent’s “Chicken Little”8 prediction.9 In fact, Oklahoma
may not feel any of the predicted aftershock of the case. The state is uniquely
situated because Oklahoma’s statutes allow the introduction of laboratory
reports--without the testimony of the analyst--only at the preliminary hearing
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
541 U.S. 36 (2005).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
Id.
See id. at 2541.
See id.
Id.
REBECCA EMBERLEY & ED EMBERLEY, CHICKEN LITTLE (2009).
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
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stage.10 Because there is not an evidentiary rule allowing for the admission of
laboratory reports at trial, these reports are excluded as hearsay.
Consequently, if a prosecutor wishes to use a laboratory report at trial he must
call the analyst who created the report to testify about its findings.11 If the
prosecution opts not to call the analyst to testify, the state must give up use of
the information contained in the report altogether.12
In addressing the application of Melendez-Diaz to Oklahoma’s current
procedures for admitting laboratory reports, this note sets forth two arguments.
First, Oklahoma’s existing statutes regulating laboratory reports at preliminary
hearings will not be altered by the application of Melendez-Diaz for the basic
reason that the right to confrontation does not apply at a preliminary hearing.13
The Supreme Court has regarded the right to confrontation as a “trial right”14
that is not required for the preliminary hearing’s determination of probable
cause.15 Second, because Oklahoma’s law does not provide procedures for
introducing laboratory reports at trial, the state should expand its current
statutory scheme to include a notice-and-demand statute at the trial stage.
Such a scheme would promote judicial efficiency by allowing a means to use
the reports while requiring the analyst to testify only when the defendant
wishes to cross-examine him. Additionally, a notice-and-demand statute
would lessen reliance on circumstantial evidence by making it easier to
introduce scientific laboratory reports.
This note will analyze the application of Melendez-Diaz to Oklahoma’s
procedures for using laboratory reports at preliminary hearings and trials. Part
II of this note begins by reviewing the Supreme Court’s development of its
Sixth Amendment analysis. The facts and holding of Melendez-Diaz will be
discussed in Part III, which includes a discussion of the rationale of the
majority opinion as it addressed the dissent’s arguments. Part IV of this note
will analyze the effect of Melendez-Diaz on Oklahoma’s law. This note
concludes in Part V.
10. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001), amended by Act of May 22, 2009, ch. 274, § 2, 2009
Okla. Sess. Laws 541.
11. See State v. $2,200.00 in U.S. Currency, 1993 OK CIV APP 22, ¶ 6 n.1, 851 P.2d 1081,
1083 n.1; cf. Chambers v. State, 1982 OK CR 1983, ¶¶ 13-14, 649 P.2d 795, 798 (noting the
defendant was barred from asserting the laboratory reports as hearsay because it was an error
he “committed or invented”), overruled on other grounds by Richardson v. State, 1992 OK CR
76, ¶ 7, 841 P2d 603, 605.
12. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
13. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that “the right to confrontation
is basically a trial right”).
14. Id.
15. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 14.2(a) (4th ed. 2004).
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II. The Right to Confrontation Before Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
The Supreme Court has recognized that the primary object of the
Confrontation Clause is to prevent the use of ex parte testimony.16 This
purpose is fulfilled by providing the defendant with the opportunity to “test[]
the recollection and sift[] the conscience of the witness” while “compelling
[the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”17 The roots of Sixth
Amendment history reach back to Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial in 1603.18
Raleigh was accused of conspiring with Lord Cobham against the Queen of
England.19 At his trial for treason, the forced confession of Cobham was
introduced into evidence and Raleigh demanded that the court allow him to
question Cobham face-to-face.20 The court denied Raleigh’s demand and he
was subsequently sentenced to death.21 In response to these practices in
England, the American colonies included the right to confrontation in their
charters and bills of rights.22 Ultimately, the United States Constitution
provided for the right of confrontation in the Sixth Amendment.23 Three years
after the amendment’s adoption, an early American court affirmed the right to
confrontation by recognizing, “[I]t is a rule of common law . . . that no man
shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross

16. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
17. Id.
18. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 481-82 (1994).
19. See Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J.
PUB. L. 381, 388 (1959).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6346 (2007). Virginia’s Declaration of Rights provided a right “to
be confronted with the accusers and witnesses”; similarly, Delaware provided a right “to be
confronted with the accusers or witnesses.” Id. Both Pennsylvania and Vermont provided the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses.” Id. North Carolina’s Declaration of Rights allowed
citizens “to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.” Id. Maryland’s
Declaration of Rights was the longest, and is often thought to be the model for the Sixth
Amendment. It provided the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” Id. Finally, Massachusetts and New Hampshire’s Declarations provided the right “to
meet the witnesses against him face to face.” Id. In 1965, this right was held to be applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
23. U.S. CONST. amend VI; see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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examine.”24 Despite the long history of the clause, courts have struggled to
determine its intended scope and application.
The analysis of the Confrontation Clause often encompasses a discussion
of the hearsay rule. Hearsay and confrontation are two closely related, but
entirely separate, concepts.25 In Oklahoma, hearsay is defined as an oral or
written “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”26
The hearsay rule deems hearsay evidence inadmissible unless it satisfies an
exception.27 A laboratory report is hearsay because it is an out of court
statement, offered as evidence of the report’s findings. As such, a report can
only be introduced at trial if there is an applicable hearsay exception or rule
allowing for its admittance. If a report surpasses the hearsay hurdle, it is then
subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment because it is a testimonial
statement.28
A. The Reliability Test of Ohio v. Roberts
For many years, the Supreme Court decided Confrontation Clause questions
on a case-by-case basis without establishing a test to guide lower courts.29 In
the 1980 case of Ohio v. Roberts,30 the Supreme Court outlined a test for
determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant
in light of the Sixth Amendment. The defendant, Herschel Roberts, was
accused of using stolen checks and credit cards.31 At his preliminary hearing,
the defense called the victim’s daughter to testify.32 The daughter had
previously let Roberts stay at her apartment, but she denied that she had given
him permission to use her parents’ checks or cards.33 When Roberts
subsequently testified at trial that the daughter did in fact give him permission,
the prosecution could not rebut his testimony by calling the daughter as a
witness because she could not be found for trial.34 To counteract Roberts’
statements, the prosecution introduced the transcript of the daughter’s
24. State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 77 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam).
25. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
26. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2801(A)(3) (2001).
27. Id. § 2802.
28. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
29. See generally Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970); Green, 399 U.S. 149; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
30. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
31. Id. at 58.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 59-60.
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preliminary hearing testimony.35 Ultimately, Roberts was found guilty.36 On
appeal, he claimed the trial court’s use of the preliminary hearing transcript
was a violation of his right to confront the daughter and her valuable evidence
against him.37
The Supreme Court constructed a test to reflect the relationship between the
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.38 The Court’s holding rested on
a test of reliability, finding that certain hearsay exceptions were so inherently
reliable that their admission would comply with the "substance of the
constitutional protection.”39 The Court held that hearsay testimony would be
allowed under the Sixth Amendment if the witness were unavailable to testify
at trial and the hearsay statement bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”40 The
Court found that the requirement of reliability was inferred when the evidence
fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” otherwise it was inadmissible
“absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”41
The Court found that the daughter’s preliminary hearing testimony met its
new test.42 The prosecution satisfied the first requirement of unavailability
when they made a good-faith effort to locate the daughter by issuing five
separate subpoenas over several months time and attempting to reach her
through her parents.43 The Court also found that when the daughter testified
at the preliminary hearing, her testimony met the requirement of reliability
because it sufficiently fulfilled the form of true cross-examination by
questioning the declarant’s perception and memory for the purpose of
discovering the truth.44 Therefore, during the preliminary hearing there was
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination and her testimony bore a
sufficient “indicia of reliability.”45
The Supreme Court adhered to the Roberts test for over twenty years. The
test was refined in White v. Illinois,46 where the Court held that proof of
unavailability of the witness was required only when the prosecution sought
35. Id. at 59.
36. Id. at 60.
37. See id. at 59-60.
38. Id. at 62.
39. See id. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 70. Interestingly, Anita’s testimony would satisfy the requirements of
Crawford—she was unavailable for trial, and there was a prior opportunity for crossexamination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
43. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75.
44. See id. at 70-72.
45. See id. at 73.
46. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
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to introduce testimony from a prior proceeding.47 Furthermore, the Court also
recognized that the Confrontation Clause was automatically satisfied when the
hearsay at issue fell within a firmly rooted exception.48 Over time, state and
federal courts began to recognize several hearsay exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence as firmly rooted, including excited utterances,49 statements
regarding medical diagnosis,50 coconspirator statements,51 statements reflecting
an individual’s state of mind,52 dying declarations,53 agency admissions,54 pastrecorded recollections,55 and business records.56 To a large degree, the hearsay
exceptions determined the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights; that is, an
exception that was firmly rooted met the Roberts test and confrontation was
not required. Even when an exception was not firmly rooted, a court’s
determination that a statement bore a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness still precluded the defendant from confrontation because the
statement’s inherent reliability was held to comply with constitutional
protections.57 Thus, the Roberts reliability test allowed unconfronted hearsay
statements to be introduced against a criminal defendant.

47. See id. at 354.
48. See id. at 357.
49. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
when the witness is deceased and her testimony was an “excited utterance” or “spontaneous
declaration” under Rule 803(2), then it is admissible as a firmly rooted exception).
50. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 900 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating “the Rule
803(4) exception to the hearsay rule which applies to statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment . . . is a ‘firmly rooted’ exception to the hearsay rule which carries
‘sufficient indicia of reliability’ to satisfy the aims of the Confrontation Clause” (quoting White,
502 U.S. at 355 n.8)).
51. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (holding that a coconspirator’s statements provide an exception that is firmly rooted and admissible under
801(d)(2)(E), therefore there was no need for a reliability inquiry).
52. See United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1993) (allowing state
of mind testimony under Rule 803(3)).
53. See Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that dying
declarations are firmly rooted under Rule 804(b)(2)).
54. See United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525-26 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the agency
exception is firmly rooted and sufficiently reliable as a provision of 801(d)(2)(D)).
55. See United States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that the use of
past recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) is not in violation of the Confrontation Clause).
56. See United States v. Waters, 1998 FED App. 0299P, 158 F.3d 933, 941 (6th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that documents meeting the business records requirements under Rule 803(6) were
admissible as a firmly rooted hearsay exception).
57. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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B. Crawford v. Washington’s Application of the Confrontation Clause to
Testimonial Statements
In 2004, the Supreme Court departed from twenty years of Ohio v. Roberts
precedent to implement a new Confrontation Clause standard in Crawford v.
Washington.58 Michael Crawford was charged with stabbing a man who
allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia.59 Both Crawford and Sylvia were
arrested and interrogated on tape, each providing conflicting testimony
regarding the incident.60 When Crawford asserted a claim of self-defense at
trial, the prosecution introduced Sylvia’s tape-recorded statements as evidence
against Crawford.61 The jury convicted Crawford of assault.62
Illustrating the malleability of the Roberts test, the trial court, the
Washington Court of Civil Appeals, and the Washington Supreme Court all
reached different results in their determination of the admissibility of Sylvia’s
testimony.63 While all three courts agreed that Sylvia’s testimony constituted
a statement against penal interest that did not fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, the courts disagreed as to whether it bore a particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness.64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay against an
accused.65
To understand its meaning, the Court looked beyond the literal language of
the Confrontation Clause by examining its history.66 The Court recognized
that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against the English
practices evidenced in the notorious conviction of Sir Walter Raleigh.67
Moreover, the Court traced the history to the first cases following the adoption
58. See 541 U.S. at 68.
59. Id. at 38.
60. See id. at 38-40.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 41.
63. See id. at 40-41.
64. See id. The trial court found the statement to be trustworthy because “Sylvia was not
shifting blame but rather corroborating her husband’s story . . . ; she had direct knowledge as
an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she was being questioned by a ‘neutral’
law enforcement officer.” Id. at 40. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Sylvia’s statement did not bear a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness because she
admitted to shutting her eyes during the fight, and her statements were made in response to
police questioning. See id. at 41. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated Crawford’s
conviction, concluding that Sylvia’s statements were trustworthy because they were “virtually
identical to” Crawford’s. See id.
65. Id. at 42.
66. See id. at 43-50.
67. See id. at 44.
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of the Sixth Amendment, which recognized the common law rule precluding
the admission of ex parte examinations.68 From this historical analysis, the
Court found the Framers intended to exclude statements from out of court
witnesses when they are unavailable and there was not a prior opportunity for
their cross-examination.69
The Court tailored its focus to the Confrontation Clause’s application to
testimonial hearsay statements.70 The majority interpreted the language of the
clause to mean that “witnesses” against the accused included “those who bear
testimony.”71 Thus, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s
protections extend to all testimonial statements.72 Under Crawford, a party
cannot use a testimonial statement as evidence at trial unless the witness who
made the statement: (1) testifies and is subject to cross-examination, or (2) is
unavailable for trial and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination
of that witness.73 The Court recognized that the downfall of the Roberts
reliability test was its failure to preclude core testimonial statements against
which the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect.74 Determining
reliability under Roberts created unpredictable results that magnified the
amorphous nature of reliability and its inadequate protection from ex parte
testimonial statements.75 Justice Scalia stated it best when he reasoned that
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”76
Unlike Roberts, the rigid test of Crawford is not driven by hearsay rules
because the determinative factor is whether the statement at issue is
testimonial. Nevertheless, a key question remained after Crawford — what
does “testimonial” mean?77 Foreshadowing Melendez-Diaz, the Court
explicitly left this definition open, recognizing that “[v]arious formulations of
this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist,” including affidavits arising
from ex parte in-court testimony and affidavits given under circumstances that
“would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.”78
68. See id. at 49-50.
69. See id. at 53-54.
70. See id. at 51-52.
71. See id. at 51 (internal quotations omitted).
72. See id. at 68.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 63-64.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 62.
77. See id. at 68. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
78. See id. at 51-52.
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C. The First Application of Crawford’s New Rule in Davis v. Washington
After the dramatic changes in Crawford, the Supreme Court considered
Davis v. Washington 79 to address the meaning of “testimonial” in the Court’s
newest test.80 Before Davis, many lower courts were still applying Roberts to
nontestimonial statements, believing Crawford only applied to testimonial
statements.81 In Davis, the Court explicitly recognized that there are no Sixth
Amendment protections for nontestimonial statements; rather, the protection
of testimonial hearsay “must fairly be said to mark out not merely its core, but
its perimeter.”82 Thus, Roberts no longer applied because the characterization
of the hearsay as testimonial or nontestimonial determined the admissibility of
the statement.83
In Davis, the Court considered the consolidated cases of State v. Davis,84
involving a recorded 911 call, and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana,85
concerning a crime scene statement by a victim of domestic violence.86 The
Court found that a statement made to police during interrogation is not
testimonial when the declarant’s purpose in making the statement is to assist
in a current emergency, and not for future use at trial.87 By contrast, a
statement regarding a past event given during an apparent non-emergency is
testimonial because the declarant’s purpose is to establish facts for future use
in a criminal prosecution.88

79. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
80. See id. at 823-24.
81. See, e.g., Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 877 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that Roberts
still controls with respect to “nontestimonial out-of-court statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy”); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he admission
of non-testimonial hearsay is still governed by Roberts.”); United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703,
707 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Roberts applies to a nontestimonial excited utterance);
United States v. Franklin, 2005 FED App. 0302P, 415 F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that Crawford “did not quite over-rule” Roberts which still applies to
nontestimonial statements); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that
Crawford only applies to testimonial statements); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d
Cir. 2004) (“Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial
statements.”); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Crawford did not rule
on whether the Confrontation Clause has any application to nontestimonial hearsay.”).
82. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (internal quotations omitted).
83. See id. at 823-24.
84. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
85. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
86. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
87. See id. at 822.
88. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

392

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:383

Recognizing the distinction, the Court analyzed the two statements under
Crawford.89 The Court found the 911 call to be a nontestimonial statement
because the declarant’s purpose was to assist police in a current crisis by
answering the operator’s questions and describing the emergency.90 The Court
left open the possibility that a nontestimonial 911 call could evolve into a
testimonial statement as an emergency dissipates.91 Furthermore, the Court
found that the statement of the domestic violence victim was testimonial
because the police interrogation was strikingly similar to civil law ex parte
examinations.92 In England, examinations were conducted by justices of the
peace and were sometimes read in place of live testimony.93 In Hammon, the
victim and the defendant were separated from each other for questioning.94
Additionally, the accused was forcibly denied from participating in the
victim’s examination, during which the police prompted her to recount the
details of the disturbance.95 The Court was quick to note that initial inquiries
at crime scenes may be nontestimonial when the officer arrives during an
ongoing emergency and he must investigate to end a threatening situation.96
After Crawford and Davis, courts struggled to apply the new rigid
guidelines that did not take into account Roberts’ firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions. New challenges arose as different types of testimonial statements
faced the courts. Many courts were forced to determine the point at which an
emergency began and ended, and thus when a nontestimonial statement
evolved into an inadmissible testimonial statement.97 Additional issues
surfaced as courts dealt with statements in child abuse cases that fell into a
gray area between “spontaneous statement[s] to a police officer” and
“statement[s] to a parent after questioning.”98 The vagueness of what
“testimonial” means has still left many questions lingering. An area not
explicitly discussed in Crawford or Davis was the admissibility of laboratory
reports containing the hearsay statements of the analyst.
89. See id. at 817.
90. See id. at 827-29.
91. See id. at 828-29.
92. See id. at 830.
93. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
94. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 832.
97. See United States v. Proctor, 505 F.3d 366, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 199-201 (6th Cir. 2007) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
98. See David M. Gersten & Amy Karan, Crawford v. Washington One Year Later: Its
Practical Effects in Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Cases, 56 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 4, 3
(2005).
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III. Laboratory Reports as Testimonial Statements Under Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts
Laboratory reports provide an effective means for the prosecution to utilize
scientific evidence.99
Such reports commonly include determinations
regarding “drug analyses, fingerprint examinations, intoxication tests, [or]
rape victim examinations.”100 For example, the state may send evidence it has
seized from the defendant to laboratories for testing to determine if it is in fact
an illegal controlled substance; the laboratory will then generate a report
containing its conclusions.101 The increased use of forensic science in criminal
cases has created no shortage of work for state and federal laboratories across
the nation. The FBI laboratory estimates that it conducts over one million
scientific tests each year.102 In 2009, the Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation analyzed 43,615 items, and the sixty-seven analysts made 219
court appearances.103
Prior to Melendez-Diaz, states disagreed as to whether laboratory reports
were testimonial under Crawford.104 Many states used the language in
Crawford to reason that reports were inadmissible testimonial statements
because they were made under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness to believe that the statement would be used at trial.105 Conversely,
99. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.01
(4th ed. 2007).
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Winters v. State, 1976 OK CR 4, ¶ 21, 545 P.2d 786, 791 (requiring the State
to prove the substance in question was marijuana as an element of the offense for unlawful
distribution of marijuana).
102. See Message from the FBI Laboratory Director, in FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI
LABORATORY 2007, (2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/lab-annual-report2007/fbi-lab-report-2007-pdf/view.
103. See OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, OSBI FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 11
(2009) [hereinafter OSBI FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ok.gov/osbi/
documents/2009%20Annual%20Report.pdf. This means that on average from July 2008 to June
2009, each of the sixty-seven analysts made approximately 3.3 court appearances.
104. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 666-67 (Colo. 2007).
105. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); see also Hinojos-Mendoza, 169
P.3d at 667 (concluding that when the only purpose of a laboratory report was to analyze a
substance for future use at trial it was testimonial under Crawford); Roberts v. United States,
916 A.2d 922, 938 (D.C. 2007) (recognizing that the admission of written conclusions from
three FBI laboratory scientist regarding DNA testing was testimonial and subject to the
protection of the Confrontation Clause); State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672, 680 (Fla. 2008)
(holding the trial court erred in allowing a laboratory report under the business record hearsay
exception because it was prepared for the purpose of trial, to prove the crime, and it was
therefore testimonial); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
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several other courts continued to admit laboratory reports under business and
public records hearsay exceptions,106 finding that because the reports were not
made for a prosecutorial purpose, they were nontestimonial and free from
Sixth Amendment scrutiny.107 After Crawford, the California Supreme Court
found a DNA report to be nontestimonial because the report differed greatly
from the ordinary witnesses against whom the Confrontation Clause was
meant to protect.108 Prior to Melendez-Diaz, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
allowed a chemical analysis report as a nontestimonial statement because it did
not implicate ex parte examinations—“the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed . . . .”109 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
found the report was more akin to a nontestimonial business or official record
than it was to testimonial hearsay.110 In light of the growing role of these
reports and lower courts’ vastly inconsistent application of the Confrontation
Clause, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Melendez-Diaz v.

that a state crime laboratory report is testimonial because it was performed to uncover evidence
to use in a criminal prosecution); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006)
(concluding that a laboratory report analyzing cocaine was testimonial because it was prepared
for litigation); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding a
laboratory report was testimonial “[b]ecause the test was initiated by the prosecution and
generated by the desire to discover evidence against the defendant”).
106. See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an autopsy
report admitted under Rule 803(6) as a business record, or Rule 803(8) as a public record,
cannot be testimonial under Crawford); United States v. Thornton, 209 Fed. App’x 297, 299
(4th Cir. 2006) (allowing FBI fingerprint cards as business or public records); Rollins v. State,
866 A.2d 926, 953 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (recognizing “[a]n autopsy report, prepared by
an ostensibly neutral party—the medical examiner—documenting objective findings, is the
quintessential business record”; additionally finding the report met the public record exception);
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (holding that certificates of
chemical analysis were “well within the public records exception to the Confrontation Clause”),
abrogated by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
107. See United States v. Ellis, 460 P.3d 920, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding medical
records were business records because they were made in the ordinary course of business and
the fact that the person creating the record might have known it could used as evidence in a
future criminal prosecution did not make it testimonial); People v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709,
711-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding a DNA report from the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner was not testimonial under Crawford because its sole purpose was not for litigation),
abrogated by People v. Rawlins, 844 N.E. 2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008); State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.
3d 306, 2006-Ohio-4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, at ¶ 88 (recognizing an autopsy report is a
nontestimonial business record under Crawford).
108. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 139-41 (2007).
109. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50; Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 706.
110. See Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 706.
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Massachusetts to resolve whether laboratory reports are testimonial under
Crawford.111
A. Facts
In Melendez-Diaz, Boston police officers set up surveillance on a Kmart
employee after receiving a tip regarding his suspicious behavior; the employee
received excessive phone calls at work, and he was regularly picked up in front
of the store and returned shortly thereafter by the same car.112 One day after
being returned to work in the suspicious car, the police detained and searched
the employee, finding four clear plastic bags of cocaine.113 The police also
arrested two other men in the car, including Luis Melendez-Diaz.114 During
the ride to the police station, the men were caught stuffing more plastic bags
into the seats of the police car.115 The bags were seized as evidence and taken
to a state laboratory to conduct a chemical analysis.116 Melendez-Diaz was
charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine.117
Without the testimony of the analyst, three certificates of analysis were
submitted into evidence at trial to show the laboratory’s conclusion that the
substance in the plastic bags was cocaine, and Melendez-Diaz was
convicted.118 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction,
relying on a Massachusetts Supreme Court case holding that analysts are not
subject to the Confrontation Clause.119 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.120
B. Holding and Rationale
The issue before the Court was whether a laboratory report is testimonial
evidence requiring the opportunity for confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment.121 In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court ruled that laboratory reports are testimonial statements under Crawford
v. Washington.122 Therefore, the admission of the report without a prior

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009).
See id. at 2530.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2531.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2530.
See id. at 2532.
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opportunity for cross-examination or the testimony of the analyst violated the
Confrontation Clause.123
The first step in the Court’s analysis was to explain why a laboratory report
is a testimonial statement.124 The majority relied on Crawford’s previous
description of testimonial statements, which included two different types of
affidavits.125 The Court acknowledged that a laboratory report fulfills the
definition of an affidavit as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”126 The reports were found to
be testimonial because they were made for the sole purpose of future use at
trial as “prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight”
of the substance.127 Additionally, the analysts were recognized as “witnesses
against” the accused because the reports provided a necessary element of the
prosecution’s case as evidence of the composition of the analyzed
substances.128 Therefore, by applying the principles in Crawford, a laboratory
report can be used as evidence without the testimony of the analyst when there
is a prior opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the analyst and the
analyst is unavailable for trial.129
After the majority concluded that the analysts’ affidavits fell within the
scope of the Confrontation Clause, the Court proceeded to address the
potpourri of arguments set forth by Justice Kennedy in the dissenting
opinion.130 The dissent and respondent based their arguments on five main
points: the Framers did not intend the Confrontation Clause to extend to
unconventional witnesses131; it will add very little value to cross-examine
forensic analysts because of the reliability of scientific testing132; the reports
are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule133;
cross-examination is not required because the defendant can subpoena the
analyst134; and the Confrontation Clause should be applied in light of the
realities of the adversary process.135

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
See id. at 2531-32.
See id.
Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
See id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2004)).
See id. at 2532-33.
See id. at 2532.
See id.
See id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2536, 2548-49.
See id. at 2538.
See id. at 2540.
See id.
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The majority rejected the argument that analysts are not the type of
conventional witnesses against the accused to which the Framers intended the
Confrontation Clause to apply.136 The dissent focused on three primary
differences between ordinary witnesses and the laboratory analyst.137 To
begin, the majority addressed the dissent’s argument that ordinary witnesses
recall past events by pointing to Davis, where a statement was held to be
testimonial even when it was made to law enforcement near-contemporaneous
to the time of the crime.138 Next, the majority rejected the claim that witnesses
must be observers of the crime or those involved in it.139 The Court noted that
experts are often accepted as witnesses even though they do not observe the
events of or anyone involved in the crime.140 The Court then denied the
dissent’s assertions that conventional witnesses’ statements are made in
response to interrogation.141 The majority acknowledged that the analyst
volunteers her testimony, but recognized that this fact fails to make her any
less of a witness against the accused.142
After addressing the dissent’s concerns, the majority rejected the
respondent’s claims that the reports are neutral scientific evidence, different
from the ordinary testimony of a witness, which may be prone to distortion.143
The Court criticized this reasoning as a return to the constitutionally
inadequate reliability test of Roberts.144 Additionally, the Court noted that
scientific testing is not immune from error; most scientific tests are conducted
by law enforcement agencies that may be pressured to produce a quick answer
at the expense of accurate methodology.145 The opportunity for crossexamination protects against these problems because it provides for the
deterrence of fraudulent analysis, the occasion for a dishonest analyst to
reconsider his testimony, and the possibility of weeding out an incompetent
analyst.146

136. See id. at 2533.
137. See id. at 2551-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 2535.
139. See id.
140. See id. Additionally, the majority could have found that the analyst was an observer
of the crime and the human action involved therein because he analyzed hard evidence involved
in the events of the case.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 2536.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 2536-37.
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Next, the majority discussed the relationship between the hearsay rule and
the Confrontation Clause.147 The Court explained that true business and public
records are admissible as an exception to hearsay but are not subject to
confrontation because they are not testimonial.148 These records are inherently
nontestimonial because they were not created for use at trial, but rather for the
administration of the organization that created them.149 Here, regardless of
whether laboratory reports satisfy a hearsay exception, they are testimonial and
thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.150
The majority rejected the respondent’s fourth argument that the defendant
could protect his confrontation rights through his ability to subpoena the
analyst.151 The Court recognized that although the defendant could subpoena
the analyst through applicable state law or the Compulsory Process Clause,
these procedures are not a substitute for the separate guarantees provided by
the Confrontation Clause.152 Moreover, the Court expounded by explaining
that the state bears the burden of bringing the analyst to trial, and requiring the
defendant to subpoena the analyst improperly shifts that burden.153
Finally, the Court refused to entertain the request to relax the Confrontation
Clause to meet the demands of trial.154 The Court stood by the principle that
the Constitution could not and would not be ignored for the sake of
convenience.155 To answer the dissent’s cry that the Court’s holding would be
a “crushing burden,”156 the majority called attention to the several states that
already successfully utilize procedures requiring confrontation of the
analyst.157 The majority further hypothesized that state and federal laboratories
would not be overly burdened because approximately ninety-five percent of
convictions are obtained by a guilty plea, thereby avoiding trial and
confrontation altogether.158

147. See id. at 2538.
148. See id. at 2538-40.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 2540.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 2540-41.
158. See id. at 2540. Assuming the majority’s statistics are correct, it is possible that in the
ninety-five percent of cases in which defendants plead guilty, they do so because the
prosecution submitted damning evidence contained in the laboratory report. Perhaps, if these
reports were not admitted at trial, fewer defendants would plead guilty because the prosecution
would lack vital evidence against them.
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While no such statute was at issue in Massachusetts, the majority
specifically noted that, in their simplest form, notice-and-demand state statutes
are constitutional.159 These statutes require the prosecution to give notice to
the defendant before trial if they plan to introduce a laboratory report into
evidence, allowing the defendant time to object to the use of the report without
the analyst’s live appearance.160 Upon objection, the analyst must testify or the
prosecution will forego the use of the report.161 The majority casts aside the
dissent’s argument that these are burden-shifting statutes because defendants
have always borne the burden of objecting to Confrontation Clause
violations.162 Moreover, the Court recognized that these statutes merely set a
procedural framework by regulating the time in which a defendant makes her
objection.163 In comparison, the majority noted that states already require
defendants to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process
prior to trial; thus, defendants may also be required to exercise their
confrontation rights prior to trial.164
After Melendez-Diaz, lower courts have a clear answer to their wideranging treatment of laboratory reports. Under Melendez-Diaz, laboratory
reports cannot be admitted at trial without the testimony of the analyst, unless
the analyst is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for crossexamination.165 This holding will cause many states to adjust their current
practices to require the analyst to testify at trial. Additionally, states may opt
to implement the simplest of notice-and-demand schemes to meet the
command of the Sixth Amendment.166
IV. Analysis of Melendez-Diaz Application to Oklahoma
While Melendez-Diaz was a straightforward application of Crawford v.
Washington, its effect on the criminal justice system could be tremendous.
Within a few weeks of the Court’s decision, the initial effect of Melendez-Diaz
was on full display when Virginia’s Governor called a special session for the
legislature to address Virginia’s compliance with Melendez-Diaz.167
159. See id. at 2541.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 2532.
166. See id. at 2541.
167. See Alan Cooper, Virginia Governor Kaine Calls Special Session on Lab Techs,
ALLBUSINESS.COM (July 27, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com/government/governmentbodies-offices-public/12600180-1.html (reprinted from Virginia Lawyers Weekly).
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Additionally, North Carolina’s legislature amended several of its statutes to
adjust to the Court’s holding.168
Applying the Confrontation Clause to laboratory reports will affect all the
parties involved in a criminal case. Prosecutors must now strategically
determine whether they want to use a laboratory report at trial; they may
decide to call the analyst to testify about the contents of the report or choose
to forfeit its use if they can prove the elements of their case without it.
Foregoing use of the report may be appealing if the prosecution does not want
the analyst to testify. Most analysts perform hundreds of laboratory tests each
year and the prosecution may not want the defense to have an opportunity to
raise doubt in the mind of the jury by highlighting inconsistencies or the
analyst’s lack of memory regarding the particular test at issue.169 Furthermore,
the prosecution may not wish to call an analyst that is confusing, longwinded,
or bad mannered.170
The Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz will also affect the laboratory
analyst and the defendant. The analyst is now required to appear at trial when
she is the maker of a laboratory report. This will undoubtedly place a burden
on her schedule by requiring her to prepare for each trial, travel to the
courthouse, and eventually testify. Defense attorneys stand to benefit by
receiving increased access to the analyst, effectively providing a better
opportunity to represent their clients’ rights. The defendant will not be subject
to prosecution through the use of documentary evidence alone, but can now
cross-examine her accuser, which is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”171
A. Oklahoma’s Procedures for Admitting Laboratory Reports at a
Preliminary Hearing
The effect of Melendez-Diaz in Oklahoma will not be as strong as in other
states because Oklahoma’s statutes only provide for the introduction of
laboratory reports prior to trial at a preliminary hearing.172 Title 22, section
168. See 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 2009-473 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
8-58.20, 20-139.1, 90-95 (West 2000)).
169. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Oklahoma, for
example, on average, each of the sixty-seven analysts at the Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation analyzed approximately 651 items from July 2008 to June 2009. See OSBI FY
2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 11.
170. Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 687 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Jurors evaluating the witnesses’ demeanor may choose to give great weight to the testimony
of one witness while ignoring the similar testimony of another.”).
171. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).
172. A few different statutes in Oklahoma cover the admissibility of different types of
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751 requires the following types of reports to be made available to the accused
at least five days before any pre-trial hearing: laboratory reports from the
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation or a forensic laboratory operated by
this state; any laboratory that a forensic laboratory operated in Oklahoma
requests to conduct the analysis; autopsy reports from the medical examiner;
reports from the Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Control; and reports from the Department of Public Safety.173 This statute
provides a notice-and-demand scheme at a preliminary hearing by requiring
the prosecution to make a laboratory report available to the defendant five days
prior to any pre-trial hearing in which it is to be used.174 The report will be
admitted at the hearing without the live testimony of the analyst unless the
defendant makes a motion ordering the appearance of the analyst.175 The
statute greatly restricts confrontation because the court will only grant the
motion and order the appearance of the analyst if “it appears there is a
substantial likelihood that material evidence not contained in such report may
be produced by the testimony of the person having prepared the report.”176
The procedures of section 751 apply only at pre-trial hearings.177 The
Oklahoma Constitution requires a preliminary hearing when an individual is
prosecuted for a felony.178 A preliminary hearing differs from a trial because
its purpose is not to determine the guilt of the accused;179 rather, it is the
magistrate’s duty to determine if a crime has been committed and “whether
there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person that
committed the crime.”180 If the magistrate finds that probable cause exists, the
case will be bound over for trial.181 Thus, the preliminary hearing acts as a
screening device, protecting the accused from unjust prosecution.182 The right
to cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is also granted by statute,183 but
laboratory reports. See, e.g., 22 OKLA. STAT . § 751.1(B)(2) (2001) (DNA reports); 47 OKLA.
STAT. §§ 751-56 (2001) (blood and breath DUI reports); 63 OKLA. STAT . §§ 944-45 (2001)
(autopsy reports by the Chief Medical Examiner). This note will focus on title 22, section 751
of the Oklahoma Statutes. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001), amended by Act of May 22, 2009, ch.
274, § 2, 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws 541.
173. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751(A)(1)-(5).
174. See id. § 751(A)(5).
175. See id. § 751(A)(5), (C)(1).
176. See id. § 751(C)(1).
177. See id. § 751(A).
178. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
179. See Holloway v. State, 1979 OK CR 113, ¶ 3, 602 P.2d 218, 219.
180. State v. Berry, 1990 OK CR 73, ¶ 2, 799 P.2d 1131, 1132; see 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258
(Eighth).
181. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258 (Sixth).
182. See Beaird v. Ramey, 1969 OK CR 195, ¶ 7, 456 P.2d 587, 589.
183. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258 (First).
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the magistrate may limit the evidence to the issues of whether the crime was
committed and whether there was probable cause.184
1. The Right to Confrontation Does Not Apply to Preliminary Hearings
Because the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable
cause,185 not all the rights and protections afforded to the accused at trial are
extended at a preliminary hearing.186 Thus, the important question is whether
the right to confrontation applies at a preliminary hearing. Oklahoma is free
to limit confrontation rights in section 751 if the Confrontation Clause does
not apply at the preliminary hearing stage. The right to confrontation arises
under both the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions.187
The right to have a preliminary hearing is not granted in the United States
Constitution,188 but it is required in the Oklahoma Constitution for all felony
prosecutions.189 In 1913, the Unites States Supreme Court unanimously held
that there was not a due process violation when Oregon’s state law did not
provide for a preliminary hearing.190 Thirteen years later, the Court explicitly
recognized that “[t]he Constitution does not require [a] preliminary hearing.”191
Furthermore, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment only requires a
probable cause determination after the arrest of the accused; a formal
preliminary hearing is not required.192
The Supreme Court has only discussed the right to confrontation at the
preliminary hearing stage in dicta.193 In California v. Green,194 the Court was
determining the admissibility of the defendant’s preliminary hearing testimony
when it stated that the “right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial”
184. See id. § 258 (Sixth).
185. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258 (Eighth).
186. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
187. U.S. CONST. amend VI; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20.
188. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975); Barber, 390 U.S. at 725; Goldsby v.
United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895); United States v. Hart, 526 F.2d 344, 344 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 1972); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, §
14.2(a).
189. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
190. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913).
191. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 149 (1926).
192. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120.
193. See, e.g., Goldsby, 160 U.S. at 73 (stating “the contention at bar, that, because there had
been no preliminary examination of the accused, he was thereby deprived of his constitutional
guaranty to be confronted by the witnesses, by mere statement, demonstrates its error.”); Hart,
526 F.2d at 344 (holding there is no Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at a preliminary
hearing); Harris, 458 F.2d at 677 (finding “no Sixth Amendment requirement that [the
defendant] also be allowed to confront . . . [the witness] at a preliminary hearing prior to trial.”).
194. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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protects the core values of the clause.195 The most notable case discussing the
issue is Barber v. Page,196 a case out of Oklahoma. In Barber, the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether the defendant’s right to confrontation
was violated when the state introduced unconfronted preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness incarcerated in federal prison at the time of trial.197 The
issue of whether the Sixth Amendment applied to preliminary hearings was not
directly before the Court. Nonetheless, it recognized that “[t]he right to
confrontation is basically a trial right” because “[a] preliminary hearing is
ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a
trial,” and “its function is the more limited one of determining whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.”198 A few years later, a
plurality of the Court went even further to state “[t]he opinions of this Court
show that the right to confrontation is a trial right . . . .”199
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the right to
confrontation is a safeguard that is not necessary to protect the defendant in a
probable cause determination.200 Here, the Court distinguished between a fullblown preliminary hearing and a probable cause determination.201 The Court
explained that a probable cause determination focuses only on whether there
is probable cause to detain the accused for trial; therefore, protections such as
confrontation are not required.202 The Court went on to emphasize that a full
preliminary hearing may be a “critical stage” wherein adversarial protections
such as the right to counsel or confrontation may be imposed.203 The Court
noted Coleman v. Alabama,204 which held that Alabama’s preliminary hearing
was a critical stage requiring the appointment of counsel because the purpose
of the hearing was to determine: (1) whether the accused could be charged
with an offense and (2) whether the accused was allowed to confront and
cross-examine witnesses at the hearing.205 In Gerstein, the Court fell short of
requiring confrontation at a critical stage proceeding, limiting its holding to the
analysis of the Confrontation Clause at a probable cause determination.206
195. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
196. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
197. See id. at 720.
198. Id. at 725.
199. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 157; Barber,
390 U.S. at 725).
200. See 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975).
201. See id. at 119-22.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 122-23.
204. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
205. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23 (citing Coleman, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)).
206. See id. at 123. Although unlikely, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could rely
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Until 2010, the only case to directly face the question of whether
confrontation applies at a preliminary hearing in Oklahoma was State v.
Tinkler.207 In 1991, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals examined a
defendant’s claim that his right to confrontation was violated under the
Oklahoma and United States Constitutions when a laboratory report was
introduced into evidence at his preliminary hearing without the testimony of
the analyst.208 Relying on Barber, the court recognized that because a
preliminary hearing is distinct from trial, the accused is not afforded the same
constitutional rights at a preliminary hearing as at trial.209 The court found that
the legislature’s enactment of title 22, section 751 of the Oklahoma Statutes
created an exception to the hearsay rule that eliminated the defendant’s right
to confront the analyst.210 The court unequivocally held that section 751–which did not provide any procedures for confrontation--did not violate the
defendant’s rights under either the Oklahoma or United States Constitution.211
The Supreme Court’s description of the right to confrontation as a trial right
and Tinkler’s explicit application of this analysis to laboratory reports in
Oklahoma requires the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings.212
A defendant may also choose to object to the use of a laboratory report at
a preliminary hearing under the Oklahoma Constitution. The right to
confrontation is extended in article II, section 20 of the Oklahoma
on Gerstein’s recognition that confrontation may be employed at a critical stage proceeding.
Oklahoma has acknowledged that its preliminary hearing is a critical stage, however this
determination has only extended the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and not the
right to confrontation. See Norton v. State, 2002 OK CR 10, ¶ 9, 43 P.3d 404, 407. Reliance
on Gerstein would be difficult because Oklahoma courts have consistently cited Barber for the
proposition that confrontation is a trial right because of its limited nature. See Howell v. State,
1994 OK CR 62, ¶ 18, 882 P.2d 1086, 1091; State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73, ¶ 9, 815 P.2d
190, 192 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72, 877 P.2d 1136; Bennett v. State, 1982 OK CR 161, ¶ 18, 652 P.2d
1237, 1241 (citing Barber, 390 U.S. at 725).
207. 1991 OK CR 73, 815 P.2d 190; see also Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, 231 P.3d
672 (Oklahoma’s recent application of Melendez-Diaz).
208. See Tinkler, ¶¶ 2-6, 815 P.2d at 192-93.
209. See id., ¶¶ 9-10, 815 P.2d at 192 (citing Barber, 390 U.S. at 721).
210. See 22 O KLA. STAT. § 751 (2001), amended by Act of May 22, 2009, ch. 274, 2009
Okla. Sess. Laws 541; Tinker, ¶ 11, 815 P.2d at 192.
211. See Tinkler, ¶ 12, 815 P.2d at 193. The statute at issue in Tinkler has since been
amended several times; for the purposes of this discussion, it is relevant that both the 1981 and
current statute similarly require laboratory reports to be submitted prior to trial if they are to be
used as evidence at a preliminary hearing. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (1981) (current version at 22
OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001)). The statute at issue in Tinkler did not contain the procedures which
now allow confrontation to take place. See id.
212. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 725; Tinkler, ¶ 12, 815 P.2d at 193.
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Constitution, providing “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”213 Although Tinkler remains
good law, it has been criticized as “overreaching”214 and for nineteen years
after issuance, it was not cited for any proposition. Furthermore, other
Oklahoma cases have implied contrary treatment of the right to confrontation
at a preliminary hearing under the Oklahoma Constitution.215 These cases
were not directly faced with the issue and the dictum is anything but explicit.
Specifically, in Beaird v. Ramey the defendant appealed after he was
prohibited from calling his own witnesses at the preliminary hearing.216 In
discussing the defendant’s right to produce evidence at a preliminary hearing,
the court recognized that the defendant has a “Constitutional right to be
confronted with his accusors [sic].”217 The court failed to provide any
authority for this proposition; because of this, it is not entirely clear whether
the court was referring to the “Constitutional right” under the state or federal
constitution.218
Almost twenty years later in LaFortune v. District Court of Tulsa County,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the 1994 Amendments to
the preliminary hearing code to determine when law enforcement reports were
required to be provided to the defendant.219 Here, the magistrate did not allow
the defendant to call witnesses because the defense could not prove the
relevancy of the testimony without access to the state’s law enforcement
reports.220
Citing Beaird, the court recognized that the defendant’s
“Constitutional right” to confrontation at a preliminary hearing must not be
denied.221

213. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20. This right is codified in title 22, section 13 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 13(3).
214. See 3 LEO H. WHINERY, OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 33.03 (2d ed. 2000).
215. See, e.g., LaFortune v. Dist. Court of Tulsa County, 1998 OK CR 65, ¶ 11, 972 P.2d
868, 872; Beaird v. Ramey, 1969 OK CR 195, ¶¶ 2-3, 7, 456 P.2d 587, 587-89.
216. See Beaird, ¶ 1, 456 P.2d at 588.
217. See id. ¶ 7, 456 P.2d at 589.
218. Because the surrounding analysis is in light of Oklahoma state law, the cited right likely
arises from the Oklahoma Constitution. There are no citations to the United States Constitution
or Sixth Amendment. See generally Beaird, 1969 OK CR 195, 456 P.2d 587.
219. See LaFortune, ¶ 7, 972 P.2d at 870.
220. See id. ¶ 3, 972 P.2d at 869-70.
221. See id. ¶ 11, 972 P.2d at 872. The court’s analysis is in light of Oklahoma’s
constitution. The court cited to Beaird, which is seemingly discussing the Oklahoma
Constitution, and the immediately prior sentence was a direct quotation to the Oklahoma
Constitution. See id. Without any reference to federal law, the only reasonable inference is that
the “Constitution” the court was discussing is Oklahoma’s constitution. See id.
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2. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ Convoluted Answer to
Melendez-Diaz
Just seven months after the Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz,
Oklahoma broke its silence and addressed the right to confrontation at its own
preliminary hearings. In Randolph v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals examined whether admitting a laboratory report at a preliminary
hearing pursuant to section 751 violated the defendant’s right to
confrontation.222 The defendant was charged with drug trafficking.223 Under
the procedures provided in section 751, the state submitted a laboratory report
at the preliminary hearing which identified the substance seized from the
defendant as cocaine.224 The maker of the report did not testify at the
preliminary hearing.225 On appeal from trial, the defendant argued that his
right to confrontation was violated when the laboratory report was admitted
without the testimony of the analyst.226 The court held that the defendant
waived his limited right to confrontation because he failed to employ section
751(c), which provided procedures to object to the introduction of the report
without the analyst’s testimony.227
While the court rested its decision on the defendant’s waiver of his right to
confrontation, it took the opportunity to address the new rule in MelendezDiaz.228 The court began by looking at Beaird, LaFortune, and Tinkler and
recognized that “the law confers a limited right to confront[ation]” at a
preliminary hearing.229 Relying on a case wherein the defendant waived the
right to confrontation at trial, the court went further and stated that the right
to confrontation at a preliminary hearing can also be waived by the
defendant.230 The court concluded that there is a limited “Constitutional right”

222. 2010 OK CR 2, ¶ 24, 231 P.3d 672, 680.
223. See id. ¶ 1, 231 P.3d at 674.
224. See id. ¶¶ 24-26, 231 P.3d at 680-81.
225. See id.
226. See id. ¶ 24.
227. See id. ¶ 28, 231 P.3d at 681-82; 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001), amended by Act of May
22, 2009, ch. 274, § 2, 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws 541. To add fuel to the court’s fire, not only did
the defendant fail to invoke section 751, but he also objected to the use of the report at the
preliminary hearing after cross-examining the analyst at trial. See Randolph, ¶¶ 31-32, 231 P.3d
at 682-83.
228. See Randolph, ¶ 25, 231 P.3d at 680-81 (stating that the defendant’s “argument is
fraught with conceptual problems, but relief is unnecessary for the more basic reason that he
waived the right to confront at preliminary examination the witness who prepared the report”).
229. See id. ¶¶ 27-28, 231 P.3d at 681.
230. See id. ¶ 27, 231 P.3d at 681; Miles v. State, 1954 OK CR 33, ¶ 15, 268 P.2d 290, 298
(finding that the defendant waived his right to confrontation when he admitted the very same
unconfronted deposition testimony at trial as did the plaintiff).
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to confrontation at a preliminary hearing, and section 751 creates the
opportunity for this right to be invoked.231
Despite its conclusion that there is a “Constitutional right” for a defendant
to confront his accusers at a preliminary hearing, the court rejected the
application of Melendez-Diaz to preliminary hearings based solely on the fact
that the case applied to the admission of laboratory reports at trial.232 Finding
support in Tinkler and Barber, the court quoted language highlighting the
long-standing acknowledgment that a preliminary hearing is not a trial.233
Moreover, the court recognized “the right to confrontation is basically a trial
right.”234 Thus, the court’s analysis contained three opposing views: first,
there is a Constitutional right to confrontation at a preliminary hearing; second,
this right is basically a trial right; and third, because the application of
Melendez-Diaz is limited to laboratory reports at trial, the defendant has no
right to confront the maker of the laboratory report at a preliminary hearing.
Further complicating its analysis, the court approved reasonable conditions
on confrontation at a preliminary hearing.235 In defense of the dissent’s attack
on the constitutionality of section 751, the court unnecessarily noted that the
statute is a “reasonable enactment” that implements “reasonable conditions”
on the defendant seeking to confront the maker of the report.236 Reiterating
Tinkler, the court stated “the rights and privileges afforded participants may
not be the same for both trial and preliminary examination.”237 In other words,
the court believes that while there is some Constitutional right to confrontation
at a preliminary hearing, the limited nature of the proceeding may not afford
the right or may allow it to be limited by reasonable conditions.
While reaching the correct result—that Melendez-Diaz does not invalidate
section 751—the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to adequately analyze and
address the conflicts within its own precedent. The majority skirted the issue
of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at preliminary
hearings by resting its holding on the fact that Melendez-Diaz applied only to

231. See Randolph, ¶¶ 27-28, 231 P.3d at 681.
232. See id. ¶¶ 29-30, 231 P.3d at 682.
233. See id. ¶¶ 30-32, 231 P.3d at 682-83 (“‘Quite simply, a preliminary examination is not
a trial.’” (quoting State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73, ¶ 10, 815 P.2d 190, 192, overruled on other
grounds by State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72, 877 P.2d 1136)), (“‘A preliminary hearing is
ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply
because its function is the more limited one of determining . . . probable cause.’” (quoting
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1969)) (emphasis omitted)).
234. See id. ¶ 30, 231 P.3d at 682 (quoting Barber, 390 U.S. at 725).
235. See id. ¶ 31, 231 P.3d at 682.
236. See id.
237. See id. ¶ 32, 231 P.3d at 682 (quoting Tinkler, ¶ 6, 815 P.2d at 192) (emphasis omitted).
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the right to confrontation at trial.238 Despite the dissent’s assertion that “the
majority concludes that there is no right to confrontation at a preliminary
hearing,”239 the court never explicitly stated this.240 In fact, the majority
merely cited past dictum suggesting that confrontation is a trial right.241
A better approach would have been to rely only on Tinkler and Barber.242
The heart of the holding in Tinkler rests on the Supreme Court’s assertion in
Barber that the right to confrontation is a trial right.243 There is no shortage of
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cases citing to Barber for this
proposition.244 Barber’s longstanding recognition of confrontation as a right
that is limited to trial should have been the court’s foundational reason for
finding that the protections of the Confrontation Clause, as discussed in
Melendez-Diaz, do not apply to laboratory reports admitted at preliminary
hearings in Oklahoma.
The court missed an excellent opportunity to provide clarity to Oklahoma’s
murky precedent. Instead of squaring the Beaird and LaFortune language
stating that there is a “Constitutional right” to confrontation at a preliminary
hearing, with the holding in Tinkler, which unequivocally declares that there
is not a confrontation right at this stage under either the United States or
Oklahoma Constitution, the court relied on all three cases to reach its
convoluted holding.245 The court’s reliance on these cases presents several
flaws.
238. See id. ¶ 32, 231 P.3d at 682-83.
239. See id. ¶ 8, 231 P.3d at 687 (Chapel, J., dissenting).
240. See id. ¶¶ 24-32, 231 P.3d at 680-83 (majority opinion).
241. See id. ¶¶ 30, 32, 231 P.3d at 681-82.
242. Reliance on Tinkler is not without its own problems. There is a major point of
weakness in the court’s far-reaching conclusion that every legislatively created hearsay
exception eliminates the ability to confront the witness. See Tinkler, ¶ 11, 972 P.2d at 192.
Under Crawford, this is no longer true. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
The Supreme Court has stated that the right to confrontation applies to all testimonial
statements, including those admitted pursuant to a legislatively created hearsay exception. See
id.; Miller v. State, 2004 OK CR 29, ¶ 25, 98 P.3d 738, 743. Despite this, Tinkler’s support of
Barber is difficult to defeat.
243. See Tinkler, ¶ 9, 815 P.2d at 192.
244. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 2007 OK CR 38, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d 1198, 1206 n.38; Howell
v. State, 1994 OK CR 62, ¶ 18, 882 P.2d 1086, 1091; Tinkler, ¶ 9, 815 P.2d at 192; Bennett v.
State, 1982 OK CR 161, ¶ 19, 652 P.2d 1237, 1241; In re Bishop, 1968 OK CR 115, ¶ 13, 443
P.2d 768, 772.
245. See Randolph, ¶¶ 27-28, 231 P.3d at 681; LaFortune v. Dist. Court of Tulsa Cnty., 1998
OK CR 65, ¶ 11, 972 P.2d 868, 872; State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73, ¶ 12, 815 P.2d 190, 193
(holding there is no “denial of any right protected by either the State or Federal Constitutions”),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72, 877 P.2d 1136; Beaird v.
Ramey, 1969 OK CR 195, ¶ 7, 456 P.2d 587, 589.
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First, in both Beaird and LaFortune the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals failed to cite any authority supporting its propositions.246 Second,
even if the court was declaring a “Constitutional right” to confrontation under
the Oklahoma Constitution, there is no evidence that the Oklahoma
Constitution provides Confrontation Clause protections that the Sixth
Amendment does not. This would mean that despite the nearly identical
Confrontation Clause provisions, the Oklahoma court was disregarding the
Supreme Court’s own language confirming that the Constitutional right to
confrontation is a trial right. Finally, as a policy consideration, the criminal
justice system would not benefit from treating a preliminary hearing like a
mini-trial. The purposes for and rights associated with a preliminary hearing
and a trial remain separate and distinct.
While there are similarities, a preliminary hearing is a much more limited
proceeding than a trial. The principal distinction is that, unlike a trial, a
preliminary hearing does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Accordingly, the state’s burden of proof is lowered from proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial,247 to mere probable cause at the preliminary
hearing.248 Furthermore, at trial the jury is the trier of fact, while the
magistrate determines whether the burden of proof has been met at the
preliminary hearing.249 There are also significant differences in the discovery
that is available. Under the Oklahoma Discovery Code, discovery commences
after the preliminary hearing, further limiting the scope, evidence, and nature
of the hearing.250 Blurring the lines between these two proceedings by
incorporating all of the safeguards of trial at a preliminary hearing strips each
of its purpose.
In spite of its perplexing analysis, the court seemed to reach the correct
approach: Oklahoma’s preliminary hearing procedures survive the falling sky
of Melendez-Diaz. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not
provide the opportunity for a defendant to cross-examine witnesses at a
preliminary hearing. Therefore, in Oklahoma, the right to cross-examine a
laboratory analyst at a preliminary hearing is limited by the procedures
provided in section 751.

246. See generally LaFortune, ¶ 11, 972 P.2d at 872; Beaird, ¶ 7, 456 P.2d at 589.
247. See Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41, ¶ 17, 913 P.2d
1339, 1345 (“[B]eyond a reasonable doubt is generally the measurement used in criminal
proceedings.”).
248. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258 (Sixth) (2001); Primeaux v. State, 2004 OK CR 16, ¶ 20, 88
P.3d 893, 900.
249. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 258 (Sixth).
250. See id. § 2002(D).
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3. The Effect of Oklahoma’s Preliminary Hearing Procedures on Trial
Although Melendez-Diaz does not directly apply to the preliminary hearing
procedures of section 751, its holding may have implications at trial. Title 22,
section 258 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that witnesses “may be crossexamined” by the defendant at a preliminary hearing.251 If a laboratory analyst
testifies at a preliminary hearing and later becomes unavailable for trial, the
report may be admitted pursuant to the former testimony hearsay exception.252
This exception must be read in conjunction with the defendant’s
constitutionally protected right to confrontation at trial. In California v.
Green, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when
preliminary hearing testimony is admitted at trial, so long as the witness was
“subject to full and effective cross-examination.”253
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has previously allowed testimony
from a preliminary hearing because it was given in circumstances sufficiently
similar to trial, thereby protecting the defendant’s right to confrontation.254
Specifically, the court explained that the testimony “was made under oath in
a truth-inducing courtroom atmosphere,” the “defendant was represented by
counsel,” and there was “ample opportunity to cross-examine” the witness.255
The court recognized that while the magistrate can restrict a witness’s
testimony at a preliminary hearing to the issue of probable cause,256 limiting
cross-examination might make the testimony inadequate for later use at trial
because it would not be a “full and effective cross-examination.”257 To protect
against this possibility, courts should recognize that preliminary hearings are
conducted for the benefit of the accused, and defendants should be allowed to
conduct liberal cross-examination of the analyst.258 In doing so, the courts

251. Id. § 258 (First).
252. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2804 (2001).
253. See 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
254. See Thompson v. State, 2007 OK CR 38, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d 1198, 1206 (citing Howell v.
State, 1994 OK CR 62, ¶ 18, 882 P.2d 1086, 1091).
255. See id.
256. See id. ¶ 25, 169 P.3d at 1206-07 (acknowledging the possibility that “limiting defense
counsel’s cross examination of a witness at preliminary hearing could make admission of that
witness’s transcribed testimony at trial . . . a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him”).
257. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
258. See Harris v. State, 1992 OK CR 74, ¶ 8, 841 P.2d 597, 599. Despite the notion that
courts should allow broad cross-examination, it is unlikely that a defendant would take
advantage of this opportunity. A defendant would want to limit the analysts’ testimony so that
it is inadequate for later use at trial. Furthermore, a defendant has little incentive to give away
the details of his case and strategy through the cross-examination of the analyst.
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may lose speed and economy at the preliminary hearing stage, but gain
valuable evidence at trial if the analyst becomes unavailable.
B. Oklahoma’s Procedures for Admitting Laboratory Reports at Trial
While title 22, section 751 of the Oklahoma Statutes specifically addresses
procedures for admitting laboratory reports before trial,259 the reports can still
be used at trial with the testimony of the analyst. In Oklahoma, a laboratory
report is hearsay because it is an out-of-court statement by an analyst offered
to prove the findings therein.260 Because Oklahoma lacks a hearsay exception
or rule allowing for the introduction of laboratory reports into evidence at trial,
they are only admitted in conjunction with the testimony of the analyst.
There are two hearsay exceptions commonly employed in most jurisdictions
to admit these reports: business records and public records.261 Oklahoma’s
narrow interpretation of these hearsay exceptions has barred the entry of
laboratory reports into evidence.262 Title 12, section 2803(6) of the Oklahoma
Statutes allows admission of a business record if a qualified witness’s
testimony can show that the record is made at or near the time of the event, by
a person or with information transmitted by a person with knowledge, in the
regular course of business as the regular practice of that business to make the
record.263 Laboratory reports are not kept in the regular course of business as
required under section 2803(6) because they are submitted to the laboratory for
the purpose of testing evidence to be used in a future criminal prosecution.264

259. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001), amended by Act of May 22, 2009, ch. 274, § 2, 2009
Okla. Sess. Laws 541.
260. See 12 OKLA. STAT . § 2801(A)(3) (2001); State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. 1985
Chevrolet Blazer, 1999 OK CIV APP 134, ¶ 5, 994 P.2d 1183, 1185 (recognizing a laboratory
report was inadmissible as hearsay when the state did not call the author of the report to testify
about the results of the controlled substance testing).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding an
autopsy report prepared by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner was a business record and
public record not subject to the Confrontation Clause).
262. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has also rejected the admission of a laboratory
report under Oklahoma title 12, section 2902(4). See State v. $2,200.00 in U.S. Currency, 1993
OK CIV APP 22, ¶ 6 n.1, 851 P.2d 1081, 1083 n.1. The court found a report to be inadmissible
as an official certified record, reasoning that laboratory reports should be governed by
Oklahoma title 22, section 751 because that is the specific statute regulating their use; thus,
without a hearsay exception the report is inadmissible at trial. See $2,200.00 in U.S. Currency,
¶ 6 n.1, 851 P.2d at 1083 n.1.
263. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2803(6).
264. See 1985 Chevrolet Blazer, ¶ 5, 994 P.2d at 1185 (holding a laboratory report analyzing
a controlled substance did not meet any of the hearsay exceptions in sections 2803 or 2804 and
was thus inadmissible).
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Additionally, the reports are not admissible as public records under section
2803(8).265 Public records are records “setting forth . . . regularly conducted
and regularly recorded activities,” records “observed pursuant to duty imposed
by law” when there is a duty to report, and “factual finding[s] resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.”266 While this
broad definition could embrace laboratory reports, the following items are
excluded from admission:
(a) [I]nvestigative reports by police and other law enforcement
personnel, (b) investigative reports prepared by or for a
government, a public office or agency when offered by it in a case
in which it is a party, (c) factual findings offered by the government
in criminal cases, (d) factual findings resulting from special
investigation of a particular complaint, case or incident, or (e) any
matter as to which the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.267
Investigative reports are excluded from hearsay exceptions in part because
their self-serving nature lacks reliability.268 Laboratory reports are self-serving
because they are prepared for the state to be offered as proof in their criminal
case.269 Without a statute authorizing their admission into evidence, laboratory
reports have been and will continue to be inadmissible at trial in Oklahoma.
1. Room for Improvement: Oklahoma’s Current Trial Procedures
Although Oklahoma’s system can remain unchanged under Melendez-Diaz,
it should not. Encouraging the introduction of laboratory reports and analyst
testimony through a notice-and-demand statute would provide better protection
for the defendant. Oklahoma’s current approach to laboratory reports at trial
forces prosecutors to use other means to prove the factual findings that would
otherwise be evidenced through a report.270 In Swain v. State, the defendant
was convicted of possession of marijuana after offering to sell the substance

See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2803(8).
See id.
Id.
See 1 LEO H. WHINERY, OKLAHOMA PRACTICE, COURTROOM GUIDE: O KLAHOMA
EVIDENCE CODE ch. 5 § 2803 (2009 ed.).
269. Section 2803(6) provides that public records that are inadmissible under section 2803(8)
are also inadmissible under 2803(6) as a business record. See 12 OKLA. STAT . § 2803(6), (8).
Conversely, section 2803(8) does not provide the same provision. See id. It has not been
determined whether an inadmissible business record could still be admissible as a public record.
See WHINERY, supra note 268, § 2803.
270. See Swain v. State, 1991 OK CR 15, ¶ 5, 805 P.2d 684, 685-86.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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to an undercover Drug TASC Force agent.271 The Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation tested the substance, but the laboratory report was not submitted
at trial.272 The court held that the prosecution sufficiently identified the
substance as marijuana by using non-expert testimony and circumstantial
evidence.273 The non-expert testimony consisted of three TASC Force
investigators who testified that the substance they saw appeared to be
marijuana.274 The court also considered circumstantial evidence, such as the
defendant calling the substance marijuana, discussing the price of the
substance, and stating that it was “very good stuff.”275 Additionally, the court
examined the secretive nature of the exchange because the buy occurred late
at night in a parking lot.276 Based on this evidence, the court held that there
was sufficient proof for the jury to have found the substance’s identity to be
marijuana.277
The Tenth Circuit has also advanced the use of circumstantial evidence in
lieu of chemical analysis.278 In United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, the
defendant was convicted of eight counts of distribution of cocaine and one
count of possession with intent to distribute.279 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
reviewed the trial court’s reliance on the lay testimony of Sarah Phillip, a
former cocaine addict, as the sole evidence identifying the distributed
substance as cocaine.280 The prosecution did not provide any scientific
evidence proving the chemical composition of the substance.281 Instead,
Phillip testified that on several occasions she purchased cocaine from the
defendant, each time personally testing the substance and finding its effects to
be consistent with her past experiences of cocaine use.282 The court considered
that Phillip was able to resell the substances she purchased from the defendant
and that the defendant discussed having a “cocaine business.”283
Evaluating the evidence, the court acknowledged that scientific evidence is
not required to determine the identity of a substance when there is sufficient
271. See id.
272. See id. ¶ 3, 805 P.2d at 685.
273. See id. ¶ 2, 805 P.2d at 685.
274. See id. ¶ 6, 805 P.2d at 686.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. ¶ 7, 805 P.2d at 686.
278. See United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1989).
279. See 893 F.2d at 1174.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 1175.
282. See id. at 1174.
283. See id. at 1176.
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lay testimony and circumstantial evidence.284
Specifically, the court
recognized that acceptable circumstantial evidence includes:
evidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved in
the transaction, evidence that the substance produced the expected
effects [of the illicit drug]. . . , evidence that the substance was used
in the same manner as the illicit drug, testimony that a high price
was paid in cash for the substance, evidence that transactions
involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or
deviousness, and evidence that the substance was called by the
name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in [her]
presence.285
Based on this standard, the court found sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude the substance the defendant sold was cocaine.286
Increased reliance on laboratory reports works to benefit the defendant by
providing an alternative to the unreliability of circumstantial evidence.
Although lay testimony regarding the appearance, price, or circumstances
surrounding the controlled substance is accepted,287 it is less accurate than
providing evidence of a chemical analysis of that substance. For example, the
accurate visual identification of certain narcotics, like cocaine and heroin, is
nearly impossible due to the millions of chemicals that can be made into white
powder.288 Furthermore, imitation drugs complicate sole reliance on lay
testimony and circumstantial evidence because the circumstances surrounding
a sale of real drugs are strikingly similar to a sale of imitation drugs.289 To
defraud the buyer, the seller must convincingly represent the circumstances of
a genuine sale.290
Consequently, under the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, evidence of an imitation
drug’s physical appearance, price, name, and the secrecy of its sale may be
indistinguishable from the circumstances surrounding a legitimate sale.291
284. See id. at 1175.
285. See id. (quoting United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation omitted)).
286. See id. at 1176.
287. See Swain v. State, 1991 OK CR 15, ¶¶ 6-7, 805 P.2d 684, 686; Cory v. State, 1975 OK
CR 227, ¶ 13, 543 P.2d 565, 568-69; Davenport v. State, 1973 OK CR 271, ¶ 12, 510 P.2d 988,
991; see also Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on
Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White
Power in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 588-89 (1998).
288. Blanchard & Chin, supra note 287, at 565.
289. See id. at 588.
290. See id.
291. See Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d at 1175; Blanchard & Chin, supra note 287, at 588.
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Given that the Sixth Amendment seeks “to advance the accuracy of the truth
determining process in criminal trials,”292 submitting the report and crossexamining the analyst would provide better protection for the defendant than
the use of lay testimony and circumstantial evidence.
Not only would the report protect defendants, the report may aid
prosecutors as well. In today’s technology and science driven world, jurors
may reasonably expect the prosecution to present all available scientific
evidence.293 Attorneys claim that the national popularity of shows such as
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, Cold Case, and Law & Order have created a
“CSI effect” in the courtroom.294 Prosecutors assert that programs like CSI
have “caused jurors to wrongfully acquit guilty defendants when the
prosecution presents no scientific evidence in support of the case.”295 A 2006
study on the alleged “CSI effect” revealed that 46% of jurors expect some type
of scientific evidence in every criminal case.296 Interestingly, the study also
found that this expectation does not impact juror propensity to make a finding
of guilt or innocence.297 Providing clear statutory procedures for the
introduction of laboratory reports and analyst testimony advances a
prosecutor’s use of scientific evidence while giving defendants the full
protections guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.
2. A Proposed Rule Change for Laboratory Reports at Trial In
Oklahoma
The Supreme Court has provided the states with a roadmap for complying
with Melendez-Diaz, and Oklahoma should capitalize on the Court’s
suggestion by enacting a notice-and-demand statute.298 Oklahoma is one of the
few states lacking a statute specifically addressing the use of laboratory reports
at trial.299 Although its current practices are in compliance with Melendez292. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
293. See Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning
Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist? 9 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 331, 365 (2006).
294. See id. at 332.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 357.
297. See id. at 359.
298. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
299. The following states’ statutes provide for laboratory reports at trial: ALA. CODE § 1221-302 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2009);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-707 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2009); CONN . GEN.
STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4332 (1999); D.C. CODE § 48-905.06
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 316.1934 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 37-2745 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-15 (2008), invalidated by People v.
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2000); IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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Diaz—laboratory reports are inadmissible absent the live testimony of the
analyst—they do not promote judicial efficiency. Notice-and-demand statutes
increase efficiency by requiring the analyst to testify only when the defendant
asserts his right to confrontation.300 These procedures allow the defendant to
choose whether she wants to confront the analyst, potentially providing an
opportunity to counteract an inaccurate report, a fraudulent analyst, or
misleading circumstantial evidence. There are many reasons why a defendant
may still choose not to call the analyst to testify. For example, the defense
may not want to call the analyst because they cannot impeach her testimony
and they believe doing so would be a waste of questioning. Alternatively, the
defense may not deny the report’s findings because they intend to challenge
the case on other grounds.301
Although the Supreme Court declined to spell out the exact elements of a
constitutionally compliant notice-and-demand statute, it did approve the
notice-and-demand statutes in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.302 Each of these state
statutes requires simple notice by the prosecution of their intent to use the
§ 22-3437 (2007), invalidated by State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23 (Kan. 2009); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:499 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-1001 (West 2002); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (LexisNexis 1996); MASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A
(LexisNexis 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 257.625a (2006); MINN. STAT. § 634.15 (2009), invalidated by State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d
304 (Minn. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.037 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320,
50.325 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-110 (2003);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 4518, 4520 (McKinney
2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(g) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (2006); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 19-03.1-37(4) (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2925.51 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.460(25)(a), 475.235(4) (2007); 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1547(c) (West 2006), invalidated by Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-49-6 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §
55-10-407 (2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 § 4 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE
ANN . § 41-6a-515 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (2008); WASH. REV. C ODE §
46.20.308 (2008); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2009).
300. Ohio, employing a notice-and-demand statute, is an example of efficiency. In 2008,
the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation handled 12,585 drug cases. See
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 26, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191),
2009 WL 4709535, at *26. Of these cases, the laboratory’s fourteen forensic scientists made
123 court appearances, which is less than in one percent of the cases. See id.
301. See, e.g., State v. Simbara, 811 A.2d 448, 455 (N.J. 2002) (“[I]n the majority of cases
a defendant will not challenge the certificate ‘either because the focus of the defense is
otherwise or because he or she may not wish to suffer the piling-on effect of a live witness when
there is no true contest over the nature of the tested substance.’”) (quoting State v. Miller, 790
A.2d 144, 153 (N.J. 2002)).
302. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
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laboratory report as evidence,303 and the defendant must only voice his
objection to require the analyst to testify at trial.304 Additionally, the Ohio and
Georgia provisions both require the notice to include a statement informing a
defendant of her right to demand the testimony of the analyst.305
To comply with the demands of the Sixth Amendment and the holding of
Melendez-Diaz, any proposed statute in Oklahoma must require only noticeand-demand. That is, the defendant need only make an objection to assert his
right to confrontation. Some notice-and-demand schemes burden the
defendant by requiring her to do more than simply object to the use of the
report.306 For example, in Alaska’s Code of Criminal Procedure the defendant
must make a written demand showing cause as to why the analyst should
testify.307 This type of statute does not reflect the guaranteed right to
confrontation because the defendant must improperly justify his demand by
providing a substantive reason why the analyst should testify.308 Furthermore,
a statute requiring more than a naked objection violates the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right because “the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the
prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those
adverse witnesses into court.”309 Therefore, any legislative changes in
Oklahoma should make it a point to implement a “no strings attached”
objection to the use of the laboratory report.
Any proposed Oklahoma statute should also include a reasonable time
frame for the prosecution to give notice, and for the defendant to make his
demand. The state statutes that Melendez-Diaz approved require a range of
notice requirements from twenty days before trial to anytime before the
proceeding in which the report is to be used.310 The timing requirement of the
proposed notice-and-demand statute should be consistent with the Oklahoma

303. See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(A); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. 38.41 § 1.
304. See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(B); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. 38.41 § 4.
305. See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1(d); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(D).
306. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (2008); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 478 (2006).
307. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084.
308. As a practical consideration, it may be a nearly impossible task for a defendant to show
cause as to why she needs to cross-examine an analyst before even knowing what the analyst’s
future testimony will reveal.
309. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
310. See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51; TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. 38.41 § 4 (Vernon 2005).
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Criminal Discovery Code’s requirement for discovery to be completed at least
ten days prior to trial.311
The hypothetical Oklahoma statute should instruct the prosecution to give
written notice of its intent to use the report at least fifteen days prior to trial by
serving the defendant with a copy of the report. At this point—five days
before discovery is to be completed and fifteen days prior to trial—the
prosecution should have adequate time to research, prepare, and plan for
whether they will be relying on the laboratory report and analyst’s testimony
for evidence. Under this proposed scheme, after the defendant receives notice
from the prosecution, he must object to the use of the report at least seven days
prior to trial. The objection could be filed with the court clerk, served on the
prosecution, or both. The legislature may desire to make any such statute
similar to the current preliminary hearing procedures, which require the
defendant to file a motion ordering the appearance of the analyst.312 This will
provide the defendant with at least one-week notice of the prosecutor’s intent
to use the laboratory report. Finally, under this scheme if the defendant objects
to the use of the report without the analyst’s testimony, the prosecution will
have seven days to subpoena the analyst for trial.
This statute should also require the prosecution’s initial notice to the
defendant to include a statement informing the defendant of his right to
demand the testimony of the analyst.313 This additional element is not
necessary to bring the statute into compliance with Melendez-Diaz and the
Sixth Amendment, but it gives further protection to the defendant at no cost
to a fair prosecution. If the prosecution must already send notice to the
defendant, the inclusion of such a statement would act as an informative and
inexpensive reminder to a pro se defendant or defense attorney.
V. Conclusion
As many states scramble to adjust to the changes required by MelendezDiaz, Oklahoma’s current approach to laboratory reports should avoid
mandatory change. Its procedures governing the admissibility of laboratory
reports apply only at a preliminary hearing, and the protections of the
Confrontation Clause have been recognized as a trial right. Nevertheless,
Melendez-Diaz has shed light on Oklahoma’s lack of procedures for using
laboratory reports at trial. Oklahoma should work to utilize the full limits of
311. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 2002(D) (2001).
312. See id. § 751(C). The proposed statute must not shadow the preliminary hearing
procedures that require the defendant to make a substantive motion showing that there are
material facts the analyst may provide that are not contained in the laboratory report. See id.
313. See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(D).
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Constitutional protections by implementing a notice-and-demand statute. This
will provide a means for encouraging the introduction of laboratory reports at
trial, thus satisfying jury expectations and protecting the defendant from
prosecution based entirely on circumstance. The implementation of noticeand-demand also promotes judicial economy while efficiently protecting a
defendant’s right to confrontation. As other states work to fix their failures,
Oklahoma should take this opportunity to stay ahead of the curve as a defender
of the Sixth Amendment.
Danae VanSickle Grace
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